| Course | GB720 Business Policy in a Global Economy |
|---|---|
| Unit | Unit 7 |
| Paper type | Scholarly debate memo |
| Length | About 920 words, 6 pages double-spaced |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Purdue University Global |
| Program | MBA |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for GB720 Unit 7
Too Little Money, or 220 Dollars Back for Every Dollar? A Unit 7 Scholarly Debate Memo on Returns to Lobbying
[Student Name]
Purdue University Global
GB720: Business Policy in a Global Economy
Unit 7 Scholarly Debate Memo
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
Harwell Structures, its board and its budget are composite and illustrative; the studies and their findings are real.
Memo
TO: Board of directors, Harwell Structures FROM: Government affairs lead SUBJECT: What the research says about returns to political spending, and what the board may infer
The question. Does political spending by firms produce large returns, so that Harwell is underinvesting, or are the returns modest, so that a larger budget would mostly be wasted?
Side One: There Is Little Money in Politics Because Returns Are Small
Ansolabehere et al. (2003) observed that total campaign contributions in the United States are small relative to the value of government decisions. If contributions bought favorable policies, they argued, firms would spend far more, because the returns would be enormous. Instead, contributions behave more like consumption than investment: individuals give most of the money, corporate political action committees give modest amounts, and contributions rise with income in the way spending on other goods does. Their conclusion is that contributions do not buy policy on any large scale, and that firms which treat them as investments would find the returns disappointing.
Side Two: Targeted Lobbying Can Return Many Times Its Cost
Alexander et al. (2009) studied one episode closely: the campaign by multinational corporations for a one-time reduction in the tax on profits brought back to the United States from abroad, enacted in 2004. They estimated that the firms that lobbied for the provision received roughly 220 dollars in tax savings for every dollar they spent on lobbying, a return of about 22,000 percent. On their evidence, targeted lobbying on a specific provision can produce returns that dwarf the outlay.
Contributions and Lobbying Are Different Activities
The two sides are less opposed than they first appear, because they study different things. Ansolabehere and colleagues focused mainly on campaign contributions, which are public, capped and spread across many candidates. Alexander and colleagues studied lobbying, which involves paid advocates presenting information and arguments to officials and is much larger: firms spend several times as much on lobbying as on contributions. A finding that contributions are small and consumption-like is compatible with a finding that some lobbying campaigns pay off handsomely.
Fixed Costs as the Reconciling Mechanism
Kerr et al. (2014) found that firms' lobbying is highly persistent: firms that lobby in one year almost always lobby the next, and few firms start. They attributed this to large fixed costs of entry, such as hiring staff or firms, learning the process and building relationships. If entry is costly, then many firms that could gain from lobbying never start, which explains why total spending looks small relative to stakes even if returns for active lobbyists can be high. It also means that a firm's first dollars of lobbying buy the capacity to lobby rather than outcomes, and that returns depend on staying in long enough to use that capacity.
The Selection Objection
The strongest objection to Side Two is selection. The firms that lobbied for the 2004 provision were those with large foreign profits and the most to gain, and the provision might have passed anyway. If so, the 220 dollars measures the value of the provision to firms that expected to benefit, not the effect of their lobbying on whether it passed. Alexander and colleagues acknowledge that they estimate returns conditional on the outcome, not the probability that lobbying changed it. A single successful campaign also says nothing about the many campaigns that spent money and gained nothing.
A 22,000 percent return on one successful campaign tells a board what winning was worth, not how likely its own spending is to win.
What the Debate Means for a Firm of Harwell's Size
Both sides of the debate concern mainly large firms. The firms in the 2004 campaign were among the largest multinationals, and the contributions data Ansolabehere and colleagues analyzed are dominated by large donors. Harwell's political spending would be a small fraction of theirs, and its fixed costs of entry would be a larger share of its total. That makes the trade association route more attractive, since the association has already paid those fixed costs and spreads them across its members.
The Side This Memo Takes
On balance, the evidence supports a qualified version of Side One for a firm in Harwell's position. Large returns to lobbying are possible on narrow provisions where a firm has information and a stake that few others share, but they are not typical, and studies of individual successes overstate them. For most firms, most of the time, political spending buys access and information exchange rather than outcomes.
What the Board May Infer
The board should not expect a larger lobbying budget to produce returns like those in the 2004 episode. It may reasonably expect modest benefits from a sustained presence on issues where Harwell has unusual information, such as the USMCA rules of origin examined in Unit 5, provided the spending is disclosed and channeled mainly through the industry association, as the Unit 6 reflection argued. A small, steady increase, about 60,000 dollars a year for association dues and occasional outside counsel, fits that inference better than a large one-time campaign. The board should judge it over several years, not by any single outcome.
References
Alexander, R. M., Mazza, S. W., & Scholz, S. (2009). Measuring rates of return on lobbying expenditures: An empirical case study of tax breaks for multinational corporations. Journal of Law and Politics, 25(4), 401-457.
Ansolabehere, S., de Figueiredo, J. M., & Snyder, J. M., Jr. (2003). Why is there so little money in U.S. politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(1), 105-130. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003321164976
Kerr, W. R., Lincoln, W. F., & Mishra, P. (2014). The dynamics of firm lobbying. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(4), 343-379. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.6.4.343
What the GB720 Unit 7 assignment asks for
The seventh GB720 assignment asks for a memo that takes a side in a published disagreement between researchers. State the question in one line. Present each side fairly, at its strongest, with its evidence. Look for whether the sides are really studying the same thing, and explain any mechanism that reconciles them. Present the strongest objection to the side that seems more favorable to your audience. Take a side and explain why. Tell your audience what it may and may not infer for its own decision. Write at a scholarly standard even if the audience is practitioners. About five pages in memo or research brief format, cited in APA 7, is common for GB720.
Inside the GB720 Unit 7 example
The memo states its question in a boxed line and gives each side a section: Ansolabehere and colleagues on contributions as consumption, and Alexander and colleagues on the repatriation campaign's estimated return. A section separates contributions from lobbying. Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra's evidence on persistence and fixed entry costs reconciles the findings. The selection objection is presented at full strength, and the highlighted sentence explains what one success can and cannot tell a board. A section applies the research to a firm of Harwell's size. The memo takes a qualified version of side one and advises about 60,000 dollars a year through the industry association, judged over several years.
GB720 Unit 7 rubric: what earns full points
Points in the GB720 debate memo depend on fairness before advocacy. Each side presented at its strongest, with its evidence, earns heavy weight. Noticing that the sides study different activities and explaining a reconciling mechanism shows sophistication. Presenting the strongest objection to the conclusion the audience may prefer demonstrates integrity. A clear position with reasons, rather than a vague middle, earns credit. Translating the research into what the audience may infer for its own decision, with limits, shows the writer can bridge scholarship and practice. Memo structure and APA 7 references for both sides complete the grade. GB720 instructors also read the inference section closely, since a memo that reports research well but leaves the board unsure what to do has stopped short of its purpose.
GB720 Unit 7 help from the desk
Many GB720 debate memos summarize both sides and conclude that each has merit, which takes no position. Others present one side as a straw figure. A common gap is missing that the two sides measure different things, which is often the key to the disagreement. Writers frequently treat a single dramatic finding as typical. The audience's inference is often left unstated, so the memo informs without advising. Present both sides at full strength, check whether they measure the same thing, find the reconciling mechanism, face the strongest objection, take a reasoned side and tell the reader what follows. Request a free custom debate memo on your assigned disagreement.
Get a GB720 Unit 7 example written to your instructions
Name the scholarly disagreement, or the reading list your instructor set, and supply the Unit 7 memo brief with its marking rubric. Both positions at full strength, a committed side, then a reply to the best objection: that memo is delivered in 24-48h, written for you alone, with no bill attached the first time. The paper above is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Purdue University Global document.
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GB720 Unit 7 questions, answered
How are debates chosen for the GB720 memo?
Often from the course readings, where two published positions disagree on evidence rather than values. Returns to lobbying, the effect of regulation on where firms invest and whether trade agreements constrain domestic policy are common. A debate with at least two peer-reviewed sources on each side gives the memo enough to work with. Check whether your instructor supplies a list.
Can the memo take a middle position?
Only if the middle position is itself a specific claim with evidence behind it. Saying both sides have merit is not a position. Saying that one side's finding holds for large firms and the other's for small ones, and showing why, is. The test is whether the claim could be proved wrong by some future study.
Who is the audience for a scholarly debate memo?
Instructors usually set it. Some want a purely academic memo; others want a practitioner audience addressed at scholarly standard, as in this example. Either way the reader should finish knowing the question, both positions, the writer's side and what follows from it. Practitioner framing should never simplify the evidence into claims it cannot support.
Where can I find a free GB720 Unit 7 sample paper?
This page carries a full GB720 Unit 7 scholarly debate memo on whether political spending yields large returns, reconciling two published findings and advising a supplier board on its lobbying budget.
Why does a single successful lobbying campaign overstate typical returns?
Because the firms that lobbied were those most likely to benefit, the provision might have passed anyway, and the many campaigns that spent money without results are not counted.