GF584 Unit 6 CITIC Pacific Hedge Seminar Reflection Example

Reviewed by Chester Goodwin, MBA Treasury Management II Purdue University Global Free custom sample in 24 to 48h

This GF584 Unit 6 seminar reflection follows a session on CITIC Pacific's 2008 Australian dollar contracts. Purdue Global GF 584, Treasury Management II, uses public hedging failures to test MS in Finance students' reasoning. The Hong Kong company needed Australian dollars for an iron ore project in Western Australia, and the currency fell from above 0.95 in July 2008 to below 0.70 by late October, with losses commonly reported near 15.5 billion Hong Kong dollars. The writer arrives calling it bad luck on a sound hedge. A labeled illustration shows a structure that caps gains and doubles purchases losing $4.4 million a month at 0.65, twice a plain forward's $2.2 million.

CourseGF584 Treasury Management II
UnitUnit 6
Paper typeSeminar reflection
LengthAbout 860 words, 6 pages double-spaced
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolPurdue University Global
ProgramMS in Finance
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for GF584 Unit 6

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Not Bad Luck on a Sound Hedge: A Unit 6 Seminar Reflection on CITIC Pacific's 2008 Contracts

[Student Name]

Purdue University Global

GF584: Treasury Management II

Unit 6 Seminar Reflection

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

Case facts are limited to what was widely reported in 2008; the contract illustration and the classmates are invented; the articles cited are real.

What this part is doingStating the starting view and the change in the lead previews the reflection's arc.
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The Verdict Before the Session

My notes before the seminar were short. CITIC Pacific, a Hong Kong company, needed Australian dollars to meet costs at an iron ore project in Western Australia. It hedged by agreeing to buy Australian dollars in advance. The currency then fell sharply, from above 0.95 US dollars in July 2008 to below 0.70 by late October, and in October the company disclosed losses commonly reported near 15.5 billion Hong Kong dollars. I wrote that this could happen to any hedger: a company that locks in a rate loses when the market moves the other way, and the loss on the hedge should be offset by cheaper Australian dollars for the project.

Drawing the Payoff First

The instructor did not let us discuss the loss until we had sketched the payoff of the contracts as reported. Our sketches did not look like a forward. A forward is a straight line through the contract rate. The reported structures stopped paying once the Australian dollar rose to a set level, and obliged the company to buy more when it fell below the contract rate. The line was capped on one side and steepened on the other.

That sketch changed my question. A forward exchanges uncertainty for a fixed rate. This structure gave up most of the upside and doubled the downside in return for a better contract rate than a forward offered at the time.

A Grain Trader's Question

Lena, who trades corn and soybean contracts for a grain cooperative, then asked what amount the company had actually needed. Her point was that in her job, the first test of any hedge is whether its size matches the physical need. Reports at the time indicated that the potential purchases under the contracts far exceeded what the project required. The group agreed that once the obligation is larger than the need, the excess is no longer a hedge. It is a position.

The losses were not bad luck on a sound hedge: the structure capped the company's gains, doubled its purchases as the currency fell and committed it to more Australian dollars than it needed, so the loss came from the contract's design rather than from the market alone.

What this part is doingThe highlighted sentence records the change in the writer's view, the evidence of learning graders look for.
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Four Rates, Two Contracts

After the session I built my own illustration, invented and simplified, to see the difference in numbers. It compares a contract buying 10 million Australian dollars a month at 0.87, ending if the rate reaches 0.92 and doubling to 20 million below 0.87, with a plain forward buying 10 million a month at 0.87.

1. At 0.95: the forward gains $0.80 million that month. The structure has already ended at 0.92, so its gains stop.

2. At 0.90: both gain $0.30 million.

3. At 0.80: the forward loses $0.70 million; the structure, buying 20 million, loses $1.40 million.

4. At 0.65: the forward loses $2.20 million; the structure loses $4.40 million, twice as much.

The illustration shows the asymmetry plainly. In a rising market the structure's gains are cut off; in a falling one its losses run at twice the forward's rate. Stulz (1996) makes the case that a company gains from risk management when it eliminates the costly tail outcomes, the states in which it could not fund its plans, and a structure that doubles purchases in exactly those states works against that aim.

What I Now Think

My revised view has three parts. First, the payoff shape matters more than the name of the contract; anything called a hedge should be drawn before it is signed. Second, the size of an obligation must be tied to the measured need, and any structure whose notional can grow as the market moves breaks that link. Smith and Stulz (1985) explain the value of hedging through lower expected costs of financial distress, which only holds if the hedge offsets an exposure the firm already has. Third, a better contract rate is never free; in this case it was paid for with sold options the company may not have priced.

Surveys of US nonfinancial firms show that most restrict derivatives use through written policies, and that boards often approve the purpose of hedging without seeing the payoff of each instrument (Bodnar et al., 1998). The CITIC Pacific case suggests that the payoff, not the purpose, is what a policy should govern.

Two Rules Carried Forward

For the policy extract two units later, I will propose two rules. No instrument may have a notional amount that can increase with market movements. No hedge may commit the company to more currency than the measured exposure it covers.

An Open Question

How should a treasurer respond when a bank offers a structure with a visibly better rate and the board asks why the company is accepting the worse rate on a plain forward?

What this part is doingEnding on a question about explaining the plain choice to a board points toward the policy work ahead.
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References

Bodnar, G. M., Hayt, G. S., & Marston, R. C. (1998). 1998 Wharton survey of financial risk management by US non-financial firms. Financial Management, 27(4), 70-91. https://doi.org/10.2307/3666414

Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985). The determinants of firms' hedging policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20(4), 391-405. https://doi.org/10.2307/2330757

Stulz, R. M. (1996). Rethinking risk management. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9(3), 8-24. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.1996.tb00295.x

The Purdue Global GF584 Unit 6 instructions

Unit 6 of GF584 pairs a seminar on a hedging case with a written reflection. Record your view before the session, briefly and honestly. Limit case facts to what was widely reported and say so. Then describe what changed your view, attributing each point to the instructor or a classmate, such as sketching the payoff before discussing the loss or asking whether the hedge matched the underlying need. Build your own illustration, labeled as invented, comparing the structure with a plain forward at several rates. Connect the lesson to research on why firms manage risk. State your revised view and the rules it implies for later policy work. Close on a question still unresolved. Use the first person and cite sources in APA 7 within the length guidance.

How the GF 584 Unit 6 example is put together

The writer's pre-session notes open the sample, describing the company's need, the currency's fall and the reported loss, and concluding it could happen to any hedger. The instructor's request to sketch the payoff first shows a line capped on one side and steepened on the other. Lena, a grain cooperative trader, asks what amount the company actually needed, and the highlighted sentence records the change in view. The writer's illustration compares a contract buying 10 million Australian dollars a month at 0.87, ending at 0.92 and doubling below 0.87, with a plain forward at four rates, citing Stulz. A section on the revised view cites Smith and Stulz and Bodnar and colleagues. Two rules for the policy extract follow, and a question about explaining a plain forward to a board closes the reflection.

GF584 Unit 6 rubric: what earns full points

GF584 seminar reflections are graded on an honest starting view and a clear account of how the session changed it. Graders look for case facts kept to what was reported and illustrations clearly labeled as the writer's own. Most points reward showing how the discussion moved the question from market direction to contract design and sizing, with each contribution attributed. An illustration that compares the structure with a plain forward in numbers shows understanding of the payoff. Instructors in the MS in Finance program value rules the writer carries into later policy work. Research on corporate hedging cited in APA 7 and a question that grows from the session complete the marks.

Common GF584 Unit 6 mistakes, and how to avoid them

Many GF584 reflections on hedging failures blame the market or the managers without explaining the mechanism. Others retell the case at length and spend little space on how the writer's view changed. Invented contract terms are presented as reported facts. The comparison with a plain forward is missing, so the special features of the structure stay vague. Lessons are general, such as being careful with derivatives, rather than rules a policy could enforce. If your seminar studied a different case, keep the structure: starting view, reported facts, what shifted the view, a labeled illustration, research, revised view, rules carried forward and an open question.

Get a GF584 Unit 6 example written to your instructions

Tell us which failed hedge your section examined around Unit 6 and send the readings, any figures discussed and the rubric. The reflection written for you tracks one view through the session, labels every illustration and keeps reported figures attributed; it is ready in 24-48h with the first free, and your own seminar contributions are left bracketed. The paper above is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Purdue University Global document.

More GF584 papers and MS in Finance samples

GF584 Unit 6 questions, answered

How much of the company's story should the reflection include?

Only what the argument uses: who needed which currency and why, what kind of contract was used, roughly when the market moved and what was reported. A paragraph usually suffices. The reflection is graded on how your reasoning changed, so each historical fact should earn its place by testing or supporting a view you held.

Can I build my own illustration instead of using the real contract terms?

Yes, and it is often better, because full contract terms in public cases are rarely available. Label the illustration clearly, keep its shape faithful to what was reported, such as a cap on gains or a multiplier on losses, and use round numbers so the reader sees the mechanism. Never present invented terms as the company's own.

Should the reflection assign blame?

It can reach a judgment, but blame without mechanism reads as opinion. Explain what in the structure, sizing or approval process produced the loss, and what control would have caught it. That kind of conclusion connects naturally to later policy work, and graders tend to reward it over a verdict about individuals.

Where can I find a free GF584 Unit 6 sample paper?

You can read a complete GF584 Unit 6 seminar reflection on CITIC Pacific's 2008 Australian dollar contracts here, with a labeled payoff illustration, a revised view, two policy rules and APA 7 references.

How did the structure differ from a plain forward?

It stopped paying once the Australian dollar rose to a set level and obliged the company to buy twice as much when the currency fell below the contract rate, so gains were capped and losses ran at double the forward's rate.